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Abstract  
The  effects  of  three  reforms  of  the  Belgian  old-age  pension  system  were  examined  on  retirement 
behaviour, government budget and income distribution of the old-age retired.  On the basis of a large 
administrative micro-dataset used to estimate and simulate a discrete-time hazard model we found 
that reforms of the old-age pension system that penalize early retirement, and in particular penalize 
early retirement of the rich more than the poor, are not only the ones that enhance the financial 
sustainability of the system at most but at the same time lead to the strongest decrease of income 
inequality and relative poverty among the old-age retired.  On the contrary, reforms that compensate 
retirement beyond the age of eligibility like the “pension bonus” recently implemented in Belgium 
lead to budget deficits and at the same time to a higher income inequality among the old-age retired.   
Finally, it was shown that the impact of reforming the old-age pension system may be limited for 
individuals that have the prospect of receiving occupational pension benefits, among others because in 
Belgium these are subject to an extremely generous fiscal treatment. 
JEL codes: J26, C35, H23     





The Belgian Commission on Ageing
1 forecasted for 2030 increased government spending of 
4.3% of GDP due to demographic and socioeconomic ageing.  At the same time it appears 
that poverty in Belgium among old-age beneficiaries is increasing
2.  The strong retirement 
incentives in social security programs and occupational pension plans are often cited as one of 
the most striking causes of early retirement and unsustainability of the system
3.  But less 
attention has been given in the literature to the impact of the design of the system on the 
income  inequality  or  poverty  among  the  old-age  beneficiaries.    Both  elements  will  be 
analysed in this paper.  This paper estimates, on the basis of a large administrative micro-
dataset  merged  with  Census  data,  the  impact  of  reforms  of  the  Belgian  old-age  pension 
system on retirement behaviour, government budget and income distribution of the retired.  
What we will show is that those reforms that enhance the financial sustainability at most are 
also those that decrease income inequality and relative poverty among the retired population 
at most.   
 
                                                 
1 Report Commission Ageing(2008), Brussels. 
2 Cantillon et alii(1999). 
3 Samwick(1998), Blondal-Scarpetta(1998), Antolin-Scarpetta(1998), Lindeboom(1998), Berkel-Borsch-
Supan(2003), Coile-Grüber(2000), Chan-Stevens(2001), Grüber-Wise(1999), Grüber-Wise(2004), Deschryvere-
Piekkola(2004), Spataro(2002),Börsch-Supan(2000), Ranzani(2006),….   2 
Three reforms will be considered.  In a first reform, old-age pension benefits are adjusted by 
5% for each year the retirement age deviates from the normal retirement age 65 in the window 
60-70
4 (=”5% reform”).  This means that a worker who retires at age 60 will have gross old-
age pension benefits that are 25% lower than if he were to retire at age 65.  In a second 
reform, old-age pension benefits are adjusted with a lump sum amount of money for each age 
of retirement deviating from the normal retirement age of 65 in the window 60-70(=”lump 
sum reform”).  In order to draw comparisons with the 5% reform, the lumpsum amount is 
chosen  such  that,  under  the  hypothesis  of  no  labour  supply  adjustments,  it  has  the  same 
budgetary impact as the 5% reform.  Although the presumed budgetary impact and predicted 
retirement  age  of  these  two  reforms  go  in  the  same  direction,  the  lumpsum  reform  is 
interesting  since  it  has  different  effects  on  the  income  distribution  of  the  elderly  than  a 
proportional  adjustment  of  benefits.    In  addition  to  these  two  reforms,  the  recent 
implementation of the so-called “pension bonus” in the Belgian old-age pension system will 
be  simulated  (=“bonus  reform”).    The  Belgian  government  wants  people  to  work  longer 
without penalizing early retirement for reasons of political economy.  In this scenario old-age 
pension benefits are increased by a fixed amount of 300
5euro on a yearly basis for each year 
of retirement after age 60 in the window 60-65.  This means that an employee who starts to 
claim pension benefits at age 65 has an old-age pension that is on a yearly basis 1500 euro 
higher than if he were to retire at age 60
6.  The three reforms do not affect the means-tested 
benefit assistance.  Although the amount of the bonus is not directly comparable with the ones 
of  the  other  two  reforms,  this  remains  an  interesting  exercise
7  since  the  direction  of  the 
income effect of the bonus differs from that of the two other reforms.  Indeed, although the 
substitution effect leads in the three reforms towards delayed retirement, the pension bonus 
generates an income effect that induces early retirement while the 5% and lumpsum reform 
generate instead between 60 and 65 an income effect that delays the retirement decision.  The 
predicted retirement age and budgetary impact for the government are thus expected to be 
                                                 
4This mechanism characterized the Belgian old-age pension system in the window 60-65 until 1992 when it was 
dismantled for private-sector employees.  In some countries like US there exist in addition to a reduction for 
retirement before the normal retirement age also a delayed retirement credit for retirement after the normal 
retirement age.  Grüber-Wise(2004), Ranzani(2006) simulated a 6% adjustment reform and Coile-Grüber(2000) 
a 8% adjustment reform with a reduction before the normal retirement age and a credit thereafter.    
5 Meanwhile, because of budgetary reasons, the bonus is only available from the age of 62 and its amount has 
increased to 624euro on a yearly basis.  
6 The bonus is the same for singles and married while the old-age pension is 60% of average lifetime wages for 
singles and 75% for married individuals if the spouse has no labour nor replacement income.  The bonus is not 
indexed to prices nor wages 
7 The retirement incentives of the pension bonus have also been studied by Dekkers (2006) on the basis of a 
fictive hypothetical employee, thus necessarily ignoring the distribution of incentives.   3 
different.    Furthermore,  the  bonus  has  a  different  redistributive  impact  as  the  two  other 
reforms since it increases instead of decreases the distance between old-age pension benefits 
and means-tested benefit assistance.   
 
This paper lies in the line of Grüber-Wise(1999) who show in a first stage of an international 
NBER research project that in OECD countries social security provisions place a heavy tax 
burden on wages past the early retirement age.  In a second stage, Grüber-Wise(2004) affirm 
a causal relationship between retirement incentives and retirement and predict the effect on 
retirement  of  reforming  social  security.    Dellis-Desmet-Jousten-Perelman(2004),  Desmet-
Jousten-Perelman-Pestieau(2003) conduct the analyses for Belgium.  We deviate from this 
work in four ways.  In a first place we define an individual as retired from the moment he 
starts to receive old-age pension benefits.  In Belgium the population “at risk” of receiving 
old-age pension benefits may therefore be at work, unemployed, early retired or disabled.  
Instead Grüber-Wise(2004) define retirement as stopping to work.  In a second place, we 
consider, in addition to their impact on retirement behaviour and government budget, the 
redistributive impact of reforms in more detail.  In a third place, since we are not constrained 
by the imperatives of an international comparative analysis, we address other types of reforms 
recently discussed and implemented in Belgium.  In a fourth place, we consider, following 
closely  Bloemen-Stancanelli(2001),  the  possibility  that  the  retirement  decision  may  be 
advanced if individuals have the prospect of receiving upon retirement a large amount of 
occupational pension wealth.  It has been suggested that the impact of reforms in the old-age 
pension system might be limited if the possible interaction with occupational pension systems 
is neglected
8. The model in this paper estimates simultaneously the probability to claim old-
age pension benefits while accounting for endogenous occupational pension wealth. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows.  Section 2 describes the micro-data used to calculate 
individual retirement incentives and to relate them to individual retirement behaviour.  It will 
be used to answer the following questions.  Does the Belgian old-age pension system give 
financial incentives towards early retirement? (3.)  To what extent do these incentives explain 
retirement behaviour and can we predict the change in individual retirement behaviour in the 
presence  of  reforms  of  this  system?  (4.1-4.2.)    On  the  basis  of  the  predicted  change  in 
retirement behaviour(4.3.), can we estimate the budgetary impact of these reforms for the 
                                                 
8 Bloemen(2008),  Diamond-Hausman(1984),...   4 
government(4.4.) and their effect on the income distribution of the retired population? (4.5.)  
Section 5. concludes.  The appendix explains how old-age pension benefits for private-sector 
employees are calculated.   
 
2.  Measurement of retirement incentives and data construction 
 
Let an individual at age t consider to retire at age R.  The present discounted value of his 
entitlement to future pension benefits was introduced by Feldstein(1974) as: 
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Where 
t s d
-  denotes the discount factor with respect to time, ) ( t s p the conditional probability 
to survive until s,  ) (R Ps the pension benefits given retirement at R andt the payroll tax rate
9 
on  wages  s w .    T  denotes  the  expected  end  of  life.    Since  an  increase  of  SSW  can  be 
interpreted as an increase of non-labour income (like an increase of initial wealth), SSW is 
supposed to capture the pure income effect on the retirement decision.  If leisure is a normal 
good, an increase of SSW leads therefore to early retirement.  The accrual is another incentive 
measure  that  can  be  derived  from  SSW.    The  accrual  is  the  change  in  SSW  due  to  the 
postponement of retirement with one year: 
) ( ) 1 ( t SSW t SSW AC t t t - + =  
and measures the financial gains or losses associated with an additional year of work.  The 
accrual  will  be  zero  if  an  extra  year  of  work  accrues  future  pension  rights  such  that  it 
compensates that by working an extra year the worker loses one year of pension benefits and 
the extra year of payroll taxes that have to be made to the system.  In that case the accrual 
does not distort the retirement decision.  If however the accrual is negative, leisure becomes 
relatively  cheaper  than  consumption  such  that  there  is  a  substitution  effect  towards  early 
retirement.   
 
                                                 
9In reduced-form studies, also this study, payroll taxes are however not deducted since one considers that the 
retirement decision is not taken at the beginning of the lifecycle but rather at an advanced age and by looking 
ahead in the future.  This view emphasizes that SSW is the present value of vested pension rights and one 
considers past contributions as sunk at the moment the retirement decision is taken.  In addition in estimations 
SSW is highly correlated with the accrual and this is mainly due to the fact that the variation in SSW is driven by 
the variation in payroll taxes that are a percentage of wages. Therefore we do not deduct payroll taxes when 
calculating SSW.   5 
In order to analyse whether SSW and accrual play a role in the retirement decision of private-
sector employees, micro-data are required that allow not only the calculation of individual 
old-age pension rights but also their relationship to the age at which these individuals start to 
receive old-age pension benefits.  The CREPP of the University of Liège provided us with a 
longitudinal administrative dataset created by the National Institute of Statistics of Belgium
10.  
This Institute first selected 29.962 Belgian fiscal households (or 50541 individuals) with at 
least one member in the 50-64 age range in 1996.  This sample has been connected to the 
Income  Tax  Returns(=ITR)  for  the  years  1990
11-1996  and  the  Individual  Pension 
Accounts(1956
12-1996) by means of the national identification number.    
 
The ITR contain all the information necessary to calculate the income tax such as household 
composition, number and type of dependants in the household, age, gross labour income, 
replacement incomes (unemployment, conventional early retirement, disability or illness, old-
age pension or survivor benefits), housing wealth, occupational pension benefits, employee 
contributions  in  occupational  pension  plans,  private  voluntary  savings  of  household 
members
13.    The  ITR  show  in  particular  at  what  age  individuals  start  to  receive  old-age 
pension benefits.   
 
The Individual Pension Accounts contain all the information necessary to calculate gross old-
age  pension  rights  of  private  sector  employees  such  as  the  number  of  days  of  work,  the 
number of days spent on replacement incomes and the gross wages for every year of the 
career since 1956.  We transform the latter, on the basis of the ITR, into net pension rights 
and converted them into real terms.  Finally, on the basis of life expectancy tables
14, one can 
calculate for every private-sector employee in the sample for each possible retirement age 
SSW as a stream of net old-age pension benefits, discounted by a real interest rate of 3%
15 
and  adjusted  by  his  survival  probability.    For  married  workers  this  calculation  is  more 
complicated,  since  we  must,  in  addition  to  old-age  pension  benefits,  allow  for  survivor 
benefits in case one of the spouses would die.  In that case, SSW consists of a stream of old-
age pension benefits, adjusted by the joint survival probability of the couple plus a stream of 
                                                 
10The original dataset has been set up and used in the context of an international NBER research project.  It is 
also presented in Dellis-Desmet-Jousten-Perelman(2004) and Desmet-Jousten-Perelman-Pestieau(2003). 
11 The tax files were filled in during 1991-1997 but concern income generated in 1990-1996. 
12 This is the year in which the old-age pay-as-you-go pension system for private-sector employees was born. 
13 Income data are converted into real data with year 2002 as reference year.  
14 Deboosere-Gadeyne(2002) constructed such tables on the basis of the Census of 1991. 
15 Since the interest rate is not estimated within the model, it has to be fixed a priori. As usual, we set it at 3%.        6 
survivor benefits, adjusted by the survival probability of the widow(er).  To calculate the 
accrual forces us to make forward projections of wages: as in Grüber-Wise(2004) and Grüber-
Wise(1999), we assume real wage increases of 0%. 
 
Interestingly, the ITR and Individual Pension Accounts could be merged with the Census of 
1991
16 that has a response rate of more than 99% and contains information on education level, 
professional  status  of  the  household  head  and  his  spouse  (blue  collar,  white  collar,  civil 
servant, self-employed, ...) and sector of activity they work or worked in (chemical industry, 
banking, insurance, agriculture, socio-cultural services,…).  The construction of the dataset is 
summarised in table 1. 
Table 1: data construction 
Dataset  Number of individuals 
ITR 1996  50541 
ITR 1995  48752 
ITR 1994  47291 
ITR 1993  47332 
ITR 1992  46907 
ITR 1991  46346 
ITR 1990  46416 
Census of 1991  50136
17 (matching with ITR 1996:99.2%) 
Individual pension accounts 1956-1996  31400
18 (matching with ITR 1996: 62%) 
Private-sector employee in 1991  9985
19 (matching with ITR 1996:20%) 
 
Of the dataset are only selected the individuals who declare to be private sector employee at 
1
st of March 1991 in the Census.  The reasons are the following.  First, we do not consider the 
non-statutory  employees  in  the  public  sector  as  private-sector  employees,  since  they 
frequently are nominated as civil servant just before retiring and thus end up in a different 
old-age  pension  system  with  different  retirement  incentives  what  could  give  rise  to 
measurement errors in the incentive structures.  Second, a lot of self-employed worked in the 
beginning of their career as private sector employee but more than 90% stopped working as 
private sector employee at last at age 42.  Although these mixed careers accumulated some 
                                                 
16 Every 10 year the Belgian government organizes a Census.  Questionnaires are sent by post to every Belgian 
citizen and they are afterwards personally collected by local civil servants. 
17 Number of individuals selected from ITR 1996 and in Census of 1991. 
18 Number of individuals selected from ITR 1996 and for at least one year in individual pension accounts 1956-
1996. 
19 Number of individuals selected from ITR1996 and for at least one year in individual pension accounts 1956-
1996 and private sector employee in 1991.   7 
rights in the old-age pension system of employees besides the self-employed old-age pension 
system, that is governed by different rules and for which micro-data are scarce, we do not 
consider  them  as  private-sector  employee  in  order  to  avoid  measurement  errors  in  the 
incentive structures.    
 
There was the issue of whether one should include observations of men that retire through 
conventional early retirement schemes.  On the one hand, the age at which the early retired 
transit towards the old-age pension scheme is in Belgium fixed by law at 65: early retired 
men
20 are thus never at risk of claiming old-age benefits.  On the other hand, if we excluded 
all observations of men who ultimately end up in a conventional early retirement scheme, the 
selection  would  be  based  on  the  future  state  of  individuals.    Therefore,  we  included  the 
working-year observations of employees that end up as early retirement beneficiary and right-
censor them at the moment they become early retired.  We analysed the sensitivity of the 
results to the inclusion or exclusion of the working-year observations of employees who end 
up as early retired and found the results are very similar. 
 
On the basis of our sample, figure 1 shows the hazard rate into old-age retirement
21.   
Figure 1: hazard rate into old-age retirement by age 
                                                 
20This is not an issue for female early retirement beneficiaries that transit towards old-age pension since they 
choose the age of claiming old-age benefits: during the period in which they are early retired, they are at risk of 
claiming old-age benefits. 
21 An individual is defined retired if he receives old-age pension benefits and his next year labour income is less 
than the earnings test and old-age pension benefits are higher than receipt of next year social security benefits 
(unemployment, disability, early retirement).  The use of “next year labour income” avoids measurement errors 
by which individuals are erroneously qualified as non-retired while they are effectively retired.  Suppose f.e. an 
individual that becomes 60 in the end of the year, f.e. in November.  His yearly pension benefits for that year are 
those from November and December while from January until November he receives labour income.  Since his 
yearly labour income outweighs his yearly pension income, one could erronously qualify him as employed while 
he definitively retires at 60.  In our definition of retirement, we group 1) those that transit from work to old-age 
pension, only from age 60 on and no cumul with other social security benefits is allowed; 2) the survivor 
pensioners, available since age 45 and a cumul with other social security benefits is allowed.  The surviving 
widows/widowers often receive very low pensions if they continue to work and/or cumulate other social security 
benefits.  From the moment that their main income comes from a survivor pension, we consider them as retired.   
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Of the population that is at risk at the age 59, 30% retires at age 60.  This corresponds to the 
age of eligibility of the old-age pension system.  The fact that the peak at age 65 is much 
higher than the peak at age 60 is simply because the population at risk of exiting is much 
higher at age 60 than at age 65.  The next section will show that the ages 60 and 65 that 
correspond to spikes in the hazard rates can be associated to changes in financial incentives to 
retire. 
 
3.  Does the Belgian old-age pension system contain retirement incentives? 
 
The dataset presented in the previous section allows to calculate for private-sector employees 
SSW and accrual for every possible retirement age.  We do so for the current system, called 
“status quo” (3.1.) and a reformed system (3.2.). Three reforms, presented in the introduction, 
are under consideration: the 5% reform, the lumpsum reform and the bonus.  In the lumpsum 
reform, everybody who has the same retirement age sees his gross old-age pension rights 
before age 65 reduced with the same amount and after age 65 increased with the same amount 
while  for  the  5%  reform,  the  amount  of  the  adjustment  depends  not  only  on  the  age  of 
retirement but also on the level of benefits.   To guarantee that the lumpsum reform has the 
same  budgetary  impact  as  the  5%  reform,  under  the  hypothesis  of  no  labour  supply 
adjustments,  we  calculated  the  lumpsum  amounts  for  each  possible  retirement  age  as the 
mean difference between yearly old-age pension benefits under the status quo and yearly old-
age pension benefits under the 5% reform.  The resulting lump sum amounts applied to yearly 
gross old-age pension benefits are in figure 2
22.  Of course these depend on the particular 
wage and retirement age distribution of the individuals in our sample.  The only reason we 
simulate this reform is to show, for the same budgetary impact, that the lumpsum reform 
penalizes the poor more than the rich, compared to the 5% reform.   
                                                 
22 Note that before the age of 60 there is no additional adjustment of old-age benefits anymore since 60 is the age 
of eligibility for old-age benefits.          9 













52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
age  
All calculations are done on the 9985 private-sector employees, but before they have been 
matched with the ITR 1990-1996.  The idea is to describe how incentives will evolve if one 
would continue to work until 70 and to avoid that this descriptive analysis be affected by 
differential selection into the sample at each age.   
 
3.1. Old-age retirement incentives in the status quo 
 
Figure 3 shows the mean SSW for each possible retirement age.  In general, an individual that 
stops accumulating old-age pension rights f.e. because he becomes inactive at the age of 55 
can only start to take up his old-age pension benefits at the age of 60.  Retirement before age 
60 is however possible for survivor benefit beneficiaries. 
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Additional years of work affect SSW in different ways.  First, as long as the career lasts for 
fewer than 40 years for women and 45 for men, benefits are increased by a factor of 1/40 
respectively 1/45.  Second, in case of a complete career an additional year of work with strong 
wage increases can replace a previous low-wages year.  Third, an additional year of work 
after the age of eligibility of 60 implies fewer years over which benefits can be claimed.  
Fourth, a delay in receiving benefits raises the probability that the employee might die before 
being able to collect benefits.  As can be seen clearly in the graph above, mean SSW increases 
slowly until the age of eligibility to decrease rapidly thereafter.  The fact that SSW decreases   10 
beyond age 60 indicates that working is discouraged by the old-age pension system.  Working 
an additional year increases pension benefits but not enough to compensate the loss of one-
year of pension benefits.  Obviously, when the career is complete
23and beyond age 65 when 
means-tested benefits become available for men, SSW declines even more quickly.   
 
To get an idea of the extreme heterogeneity of retirement incentives across individuals, one 
can look at the 10
th and 90
th percentiles: beyond age 60 the decrease in SSW is very slow for 
those with a low SSW compared to those with a high SSW.  Inspection of our dataset reveals 
this is primarily due to the fact that those in the 10
th percentile have often an incomplete 
career and/or wages below the ceiling and those in the 90
th percentile have often wages that 
reach the wage ceiling.   
Figure 4: 90
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The fact that the old-age pension system is actuarially unfair at the margin is reflected in a 
negative accrual for all possible retirement ages.  The accrual is negative before age 60 since 
the pension rights grow by only 1/45 while payroll taxes still have to be paid.  At the age of 
eligibility of 60, there is in addition a clear downward jump in the accrual.  From then on, 
working one more year means also the loss of one year of pension benefits.   
                                                 
23In the dataset there are employees that started to work at age 14 and have completed their career before 60.    11 
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It may be that the mean accrual is negative but that, due to the heterogeneity of accruals 
among individuals, some employees do face positive accruals.  
Figure 7: 90
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The 90th percentile accrual is however mainly
24 negative: this means that nearly the whole 
population  of  private  sector  employees  faces  incentives  towards  early  retirement.    It 
corresponds to individuals with wages under the ceiling and/or incomplete careers.  Note also 
the decrease in the accrual at age 65 at which means-tested benefits become available for 
men.  The 10
th percentile accrual on the other hand corresponds to individuals with the highest 
                                                 
24 Desmet-Jousten-Perelman-Pestieau(2003) find similarly that the highest decile of the accrual has negative 
values.   12 
wages that are only taken into account up to the wage ceiling for calculating benefits while at 
the same time they pay high payroll taxes that are due on all wage income
25.   
       
3.2. Old-age retirement incentives in the reformed pension system 
 
As shown above, the old-age pension system is not actuarially fair at the margin since paying 
one more year payroll taxes and the corresponding loss of pension benefits during that year is 
not sufficiently compensated by accrued pension rights.  In this section the focus is on the 
retirement incentives that prevail under a reformed old-age pension system.       
 
In figure 9 the evolution of mean SSW over age of three reformed old-age pension systems is 
compared with the mean SSW of the status quo. 
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The 5% and lumpsum reform cause the mean SSW to increase with age and shift the peak in 
SSW from age 60 to 65.  Compared to the status-quo, SSW starts at a lower amount for 
retirement ages before 65 but afterwards it is higher.  It is not surprising that in the age range 
60  to  65  SSW  increases  if  benefits  are  adjusted  by  5%  or  a  lumpsum  amount  while  it 
decreases under the status quo. 
 
Compared to the status-quo, the bonus leads to a higher mean SSW after age 60
26.  The 
amount of the bonus is however insufficient to shift the peak in the 90
th percentile and mean 
SSW to the right: the peak stays at age 60, except for the 10
th percentile SSW.  This is a major 
difference  with  the  other  two  reforms.    The  effect  of  the  bonus  is  relatively  stronger  on 
                                                 
25 Desmet-Jousten(2003) note that “the Belgian wage-earners scheme takes on Beveridgean characteristics for 
people over the wage ceiling.  High income workers face high contributions on their labour income and hence 
the adjustment to keep SSW unchanged is much higher than for individuals below the ceiling facing a rather 
Bismarckian system”. 
26Since the bonus is only attributed after 60, it has no effect on SSW before age 60.   13 
employees with a low SSW than a high SSW.  This has to do with the fact the bonus is a fixed 
amount and thus has more effect on individuals with low pension benefits. 
 
Note also that before age 65, the 90
th percentile SSW of the 5% adjustment is lower than that 
of the lumpsum reform.  This is because for individuals with a high SSW a reduction of 5% is 
more  penalizing  than  a  reduction  with  the  lumpsum  amount.    Beyond  age  65,  the  90
th 
percentile SSW of the lumpsum reform lies below that of the 5% reform since for individuals 
with a high SSW an increase of 5% is more than an increase with the lump sum adjustment.  
For  individuals  with  a  low  SSW  (10
th  percentile  SSW)  one  can  hardly  see  a  difference 
between  the  impact  of  the  lumpssum  and  5%  adjustment  reform  because  these  reforms 
mechanically induce a high proportion of individuals to the means-tested benefits of which 
the amount is insensitive to these reforms. 
Figure 10: 90
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Compared to the status-quo, the 5% adjustment of benefits enhances the actuarial fairness at 
the margin: instead of a downwards kink in the accrual at age 60, the accrual significantly 
increased.  The discontinuity in the accrual profile at age 60 is due to the fact that in the range 
60-65 the adjustment factor increases with 5% for each age deviating from the pivotal age of 
65  but  below  age  60  there  is  no  additional  adjustment  of  5%.    Furthermore,  the  accrual   14 
decreases beyond 60: the closer one comes to the age of 65 the higher the actuarial adjustment 
factor should be in order to keep the accrual constant with age.
27   
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Compared to the other 2 reforms, the pension bonus has a much smaller effect.  To generate a 
similar incentive structure as the 5% reform, the amount of the bonus should be higher and be 
differentiated in function of income.  In addition since it is limited to the age range 60-65, the 
bonus  leads  to  a  strong  downwards  jump  in  the  accrual  at  age  65.      This  is  even  more 
pronounced in the 90th percentile accrual.   
 
For those in the 90
th percentile (those with the lowest incentives to retire), the bonus has its 
full effect at least until age 65.  The bonus eliminates the dip at age 60 but beyond age 65 the 
bonus is not attributed anymore and leads to an even stronger dip at age 65.   On the contrary, 
the individuals in the 10
th percentile accrual are those who receive the lowest increase of old-
age benefits when they work one more year.  Among them are concentrated the individuals 
who because of high wages, attained the wage ceiling and pay high payroll taxes.  For them, 
the bonus is too low to eliminate the downwards jump in the accrual at the age of 60.  
 
When  comparing the  10
th  and  90
th  percentiles  accruals,  one  sees  again  that  the lumpsum 
reform has a very similar effect as the 5% reform on the 90
th percentile accrual (with low 
retirement incentives) while it has a much weaker effect on individuals in the 10
th percentile 
accrual  (with  high  retirement  incentives).    The  latter  correspond  to  individuals  with  high 
wages that attain the wage ceiling and pay high payroll taxes. 
                                                 
27Desmet-Jousten(2003) find that in order to obtain actuarial fairness at the margin, the total adjustment factor of 
benefits should be 10% at age 64 but only 6% at age 60.     15 
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We conclude that of the 3 reforms the 5% reform gives the strongest work incentives and the 
bonus the lowest.  The 5% reform in addition has a strong impact on the incentives of the high 
income individuals while the lumpsum reform and the bonus have a relatively stronger impact 
on the incentives of the low income individuals.    
 
4.  Impact of a reform of the old-age pension system 
 
It was shown that the Belgian old-age pension system contains incentives to retire early and 
that moving towards a system that is actuarially fair at the margin alleviates these retirement 
incentives.  In this section one explains the discrete-time hazard model that will be used (4.1.) 
to estimate to what extent these retirement incentives in the old-age pension system explain 
observed retirement behaviour (4.2.).  The estimated coefficients can then be used to simulate 
the retirement age (4.3.), budgetary impact (4.4.) and redistributive impact on the incomes of 
the retired population (4.5.) of the three previously introduced reforms of the old-age pension 
system.   
 
4.1. The model  
   16 
Since we consider retirement in the old-age system as an irreversible decision
28 that is taken 
conditional on not having retired before, the hazard model is a natural candidate to model this 
event,  following  Schils(2006),  Spataro(2002),  Piekkola-Deschryvere(2004),  Euwals-
Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006),  Meghir-Whitehouse(1997),  Lindeboom(1998),  Antolin-
Scarpetta(1998) and Diamond-Hausman(1984).  Although in the real world retirement can 
occur at any time, the model is in discrete time since our data are grouped into intervals of 
one  calendar  year.    Jenkins(1995)  showed  that  the  procedure  to  estimate  a  discrete-time 
hazard model is equivalent to the estimation of a panel data model with a sequence of binary 
dependent variables.  One can define the probability that an employee i=1,…,N retires in the 
calendar year t=1,..,T after a career of duration d as  ) 0 ( Pr
* > = it it y ob P that results from the 
latent  model it i it it u c d f x y + + + = ) (
* b where
*
it y   denotes  the  unobservable  propensity  to 
claim old-age pension benefits,  b is the vector of coefficients associated with it x , a vector of 
exogenous  and  possibly  time-varying  explanatory  variables  that  will  be  discussed  below. 
) (d f  is a function of duration dependence that represents the baseline hazard and captures 
number of years of the career
29. Note that the career covers, on the basis of the individual 
pension accounts, not only the years effectively worked but also the years assimilated to 
worked years since, as already said, the population at risk of claiming old-age benefits may be 
at work, unemployed, disabled or early retired.  We are thus estimating a binary response 
model where the dependent variable 
                                                 
28 For single spell data, estimation results are sensitive to misspecification of the distribution of unobserved 
effects.  However, claiming old-age pension benefits is a decision that occurs only once: only 0.7% of those 
receiving in a given year old-age pension benefits receive in the following year labour income and could be 
considered as reentry in the labour market.  In 80% of these cases it concerns survivor benefits before age 60.   
29Often discrete-time hazard models assume a piecewise constant baseline hazard: duration dummies are used for 
each possible duration of the employment spell.  Duration itself is “proxied” by the time period between the age 
at which one may consider to retire (50 or 55) and the effective retirement age(Buttler-Huguenin-Teppa(2004), 
Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006),  Schils(2006),  Piekkola-Deschryvere(2004),  Antolin-Scarpetta(1998), 
Diamond-Hausman(1984))  or  by  age  itself(Spataro(2002))).    In  that  case  it  becomes  difficult  to  see  the 
difference, except for the distribution in the random error terms, with binary response panel data models that 
include age dummies to control for a pure age effect.  Coile-Grüber(2000) note: “we have also estimated these 
(binary probit) models (with age dummies) as Cox proportional hazard models and the results were very similar; 
this is not surprising, given that the models all include a full set of age dummies, which pick up the same factors 
captured by the baseline in the hazard model”(p.23).  In our paper, we included, like Meghir-Whitehouse(1997) 
and  Lindeboom(1998),  both  duration  of  career  and  an  age  variable,  because  people  of  the  same  age  with 















.  It takes account of right-censored spells under the assumption they are 
randomly censored.  If the random error term  it u is logistically distributed
30, this means: 
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= .  We allow for unobserved individual-specific time-constant 
heterogeneity
31 captured by  i c .  As explained by Lancaster(1990), one might expect indeed 
that  there  are  individual-specific  unobserved  effects  like  ability,  motivation  or  general 
attitudes that make individual have a high propensity to retire while others not, the population 
at risk may be over time more and more composed of individuals that have a low propensity 
to retire.  This sorting effect can bias not only the baseline hazard but alsob .  The inclusion 
of an unobserved effect allows to correct for this sorting effect.   
 
Explanatory variables  
 
One of the crucial explanatory variables in this model that one seeks to identify are financial 
retirement  incentives,  like  SSW  and  accrual.    Besides  retirement  incentives,  we  include 
individual observed characteristics such as education level of the employee, region where he 
lives  (Brussels,  Wallonia  or  Flanders)  and  the  sector  he  works  or  worked  in.    The  age 
difference  between  the  individual  and  his  eventual  partner  was  included  to  account  for 
                                                 
30 Spataro(2002) and Coile-Grüber(2000) estimated discrete time hazard models with an extreme value, normal 
and logistic random error term and got very similar results.  Deschryvere-Piekkola(2004) find that the hazard 
ratios in an extreme value model are of different magnitude than the marginal effects from a probit model.  Their 
comparison is however not clear since the reference individual to calculate hazard ratios is not the average 
individual used for calculating marginal effects.  Sueyoshi(1995) explores the implications of specifications for 
hazard behaviour and notes that “practical experience with discrete-choice models suggests that the predicted 
probabilities and hence the goodness-of-fit tests for the models will generally be quite similar.”  Apart from 
goodness-of-fit tests, “results from the logit and proportional hazard specifications will be quite similar.  In 
contrast, estimates from a probit-type group duration model should depart significantly from both of these 
specifications, exhibiting covariate effects that are decidedly non-proportional” while “logistic models are only 
slightly less proportional than the extreme value specification”.  Applied to retirement models, this means 
according to Euwals-Vuuren-Wolthoff(2006): “Probit regressions per age allow for a different impact of the 
financial incentives at different ages .  In our hazard rate model we restrict the impact of a given financial 
incentive to be the same over different early retirement ages”(p.16).  
31 We found only very few examples in the retirement literature that allow for individual-specific effects.  
Euwals-Vuuren-Wolthoff(2006), Schils(2006) and Meghir-Whitehouse(1997) assume in a hazard model a 
discrete mass point and Diamond-Hausman(1984) a gamma distribution for the unobserved effect and all found 
significant unobserved heterogeneity.  Spataro(2002) assumes in a hazard model a normally distributed 
unobserved effect with mean zero that is not significant.  Borsch-Supan(2000) find in a panel probit that 
unobserved heterogeneity (AR(1),MA(1)) biases the measurement of incentive effects.   18 
possible coordination of household members of their retirement decision.
32  As time-varying 
variables we include age of the private-sector employee, year dummies, housing wealth and 
the  number  of  dependent  children  and  disabled.
33    Finally,  we  included  a  dummy  for 
employees who have received at least once in the sampling period unemployment or disability 




Endogeneity in this model may arise in the first place due to an omitted variable bias where 
the omitted variable is correlated with an explanatory variable of interest leading to 
inconsistent estimation of the coefficients. Boskin-Hurd(1978) are one of the first to consider 
what is known as “the identification problem of SSW”, that is the possibility that SSW is 
endogenous since it is correlated with unobserved individual tastes for work.  Those with a 
taste for work would have worked hard all their live, have higher wages and hence be eligible 
for larger benefits and thus a higher SSW.  If one is unable to separate preferences for work 
from financial incentives, one could thus end up with a negative coefficient of SSW 
suggesting that a higher SSW decreases the probability to retire while the lifecycle theory 
suggests instead a positive income effect: a higher SSW should increase the probability to 
retire if leisure is a normal good.  Chan-Stevens(2001) show that neglecting this identification 
issue, as sometimes happens in the literature
34, may lead to significant bias in the estimated 
coefficients.  There are at least two possible solutions
35.  A first possible solution is a 2SLS 
procedure in which SSW is replaced by an instrumental variable that is highly correlated with 
SSW but not with “tastes for work”.  If f.e. our dataset would cover a period before and after a 
pension reform, this would create interesting conditions for a natural experiment, as in 
Krueger-Pischke(1992), Ranzani(2006) and Meghir-Whitehouse(1997).  They use 
interactions between birth cohorts and time dummies as identifying instruments of SSW.  In 
                                                 
32 Desmet-Lozachmeur(2002) showed that in Belgium 79% of men and women stop working in the same year or 
with a difference of one year.  This may be for various reasons (like complementarity in preferences for leisure 
or spillover effects of retirement incentives on the partner) that we do not analyse here. 
33 A priori, these can be exogenous or endogenous.  To test whether the fact of retiring might influence future 
housing wealth and household composition, we regress these variables on lagged retirement status and all other 
observed characteristics and found the former is not significant.  Housing wealth and household composition are 
therefore considered as exogenous.   
34  Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006), Piekkola-Deschryvere(2004), Boskin-Hurd(1978).  Borsch-Supan(2000) 
allows for an individual specific random effect that is supposed to capture preference for leisure but that is 
implicitly supposed to be uncorrelated with SSW.. 
35 Schils(2006) uses on the basis of survey data a variable “wants a reduction in working hours” as a proxy for 
the impact of individual preferences for working   19 
that case, the main source of variability of SSW is the one induced by policy changes over 
time that affect the level of benefits.  Since however our data fall between two pension 
reforms, we opt for the second solution that is to control directly for a proxy for “tastes for 
work” in  it x .  A good proxy should be sufficiently correlated with tastes for work such that 
once it is included, SSW is no more correlated with the unobserved effect
36.  If one looks at 
the way how SSW is constructed, the obvious input in SSW that might be correlated with 
unobserved tastes for work is average lifetime wages as suggested by Coile-Grüber(2000), 
Grüber-Wise(2004) and Spataro(2002).  They include average lifetime wages directly in the 
equation in order to capture unobserved taste for work and allow average lifetime wages to be 
time-varying in order to allow for upward wage increases.  A little bit different is the notion 
of “permanent income” of Diamond-Hausman(1984) that we used: a time-constant concept of 
average lifetime wages based on effectively worked periods where they “excluded from the 
averaging procedure years when the individual reported himself as retired, out of the labor 
force for much of the year or working only part time”(p.84).   
 
The question that arises is how much variation is left in SSW, if one controls for average 
lifetime wages?  The following figure plots mean, 90th, 10
th, 95
th, 5
th percentile, first and third 
quartile of SSW against the distribution of average lifecycle wages in percentiles.  This shows 
that SSW is a non-linear function of average lifetime wages.  The important thing is the 
extreme variation in SSW across individuals with the same level of average lifecycle wages. 
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A first reason why the relationship between SSW and average lifecycle wages is not linear 
and why there is so much variation among individuals is because yearly old-age pension 
benefits are not linear in average lifecycle wages: the old-age pension system has for every 
year of the career a floor and a ceiling and old-age pension benefits assimilate periods of 
inactivity to periods of activity while these are not taken into account in the calculation of 
                                                 
36 See Wooldridge(2002) p.63-65.   20 
average lifecycle wages.  Besides that, there are several reasons why, even for individuals that 
would have for every year of their career a wage between the floor and the ceiling and have 
no assimilated periods, SSW is not a linear function of average lifecycle wages: 1) Average 
lifecycle wages is time-constant for each individual
37 while SSW changes for each individual 
over time; 2) average lifecycle wages is gross while SSW is constructed on the basis of net 
pension benefits, after a progressive income tax; 3) SSW integrates means-tested benefits in 
contrast to average lifecycle wages 4) SSW is a discounted sum of benefits in contrast to 
average  lifecycle  wages;  5)  SSW  is  an  expected  discounted  sum  of  benefits, adjusted  by 
survival probability in contrast to average lifecycle wages.  It are thus the non-linearities that 
come from exogenously imposed and complex pension legislation
38, income tax legislation 
and the conversion into expected and into discounted wealth, that lead to a strong variability 
of  SSW  across  individuals  and  that  is  supposed  to  identify  SSW.    As  noted  by  Grüber-
Wise(2004),  the  full  effect  of  incentives  may  however  be  understated  when  one  controls 
separately for average lifetime wages since the latter also determines in part the value of the 
incentive measures. 
 
A related problem arises with the identification of the variable age.  A priori, age may capture 
deteriorating health status, increasing preferences for leisure, social norms and/or eligibility 
rules in pension systems
39.  Since deteriorating health status, increasing preferences for leisure 
and social norms may be interesting determinants of retirement we want to include a variable 
for age that can be considered as a proxy.  However, we would like that the age variable does 
not  absorb  eligibility  rules  like  eligibility  ages  60  or  65.    The  piecewise-constant  hazard 
models that work with age dummies as a proxy for “duration” are in general silent about this 
issue, as well as several panel probit models
40 that include age dummies.  Other models avoid 
the use of age dummies and use a nonlinear function of age
41.  If however social norms would 
lead to retirement at specific ages like 60 or 65, a nonlinear function of age risks not to fully 
capture  social  norms.    In  addition  the  goodness-of-fit  may  simply  be  better  if  using  age 
dummies.  Since the only thing that interests us is actually the measurement of the impact of 
incentives on behaviour (and not the measurement of social norms), we prefer a priori a 
                                                 
37 If we would allow it to be time-varying in order to allow upward wage increases it would be zero for those 
relying on replacement incomes implying that the unemployed, early retired and disabled do not like to work and 
have all exactly the same preferences for leisure what is a strong assumption and decreases variability of this 
variable across individuals. 
38 see appendix. 
39 See Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006). 
40 Piekkola-Deschryvere(2004), Börsch-Supan(2003), Berkel-Börsch-Supan(2003),…. 
41 Meghir-Whitehouse(1997), Spataro(2002).   21 
nonlinear specification of age variable.  Following Grüber-Wise(2004) we estimate however 
two specifications of the retirement model: a model with a non-linear function of age and a 
model including age-specific dummy variables.  This allows to test whether the coefficient of 
SSW is robust to the specification of age variable
42.   
 
A final endogeneity issue that we consider refers us back to Feldstein(1974) who introduced 
the idea that if workers accumulate more wealth in order to afford themselves to retire early, 
then the impact of social security on savings is ambiguous: decreased savings due to the tax 
and wealth transfer effects may be offset the increased savings due to the early retirement 
effect.  We do not aim to model the labour supply decision simultaneously with the savings 
decision:  we  do  not  have  data  for  it.    Nonetheless,  figure  16  shows  the  hazard  rate  of 
withdrawing occupational pension wealth
43 with the hazard rate in old-age retirement.  Their 
shape is very similar and suggests that the decision to dissave and to retire in the old-age 
pension system should be modelled simultaneously.   
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Stock-Wise(1990) and others argue that to measure the impact of social security policy it is 
important  to  treat  occupational  pensions  and  retirement  as  joint  outcomes.    In  particular 
Stock-Wise(1990)
44 demonstrate that for individuals with pension plan availability changes in 
social security policy will have very little effect.  Although the median pension plan may not 
                                                 
42 We also tested if no age variable is included whether the incentives measures alone capture the important 
peaks in retirement at age 60 and 65 and to what extent the age variable may absorb eligibility rules.  The sign of 
SSW becomes negative suggesting that leisure is an inferior good.  This is a major reason why we did not use 
these estimation results for our simulation.  An explanation may be that the age variable captures unobserved 
preferences for work or preferences for leisure.  Note that this idea has already been exploited by structural  
models of retirement. 
43 Private assets are not the same as occupational pension wealth.  The latter can indeed be considered as a form 
of forced savings while private assets are voluntary savings.  Nonetheless, under the hypothesis that private-
sector employees that have high occupational pension wealth are also the ones that have private assets while 
private-sector employees without occupational pension wealth risk to have no private assets either, we consider 
occupational pension wealth as a proxy for private assets. 
44 See also Mitchell-Fields(1984) for the US, Euwals-Vanvuuren-Wolthoff(2006) for the Netherlands, Meghir-
Whitehouse(1997) and Blundell et alii.(2002) for the UK.     22 
provide early retirement incentives, pension plan provisions may contribute importantly to the 
observed labour force decline if some plans provide such incentives
45.  The following table 
shows  the  distribution  of  occupational  wealth  that  is  withdrawn  by  those  who  retire  by 
retirement age.  For those people that are entitled to occupational pension wealth it concerns 
in 12% of the cases amounts that outweigh old-age pension wealth.   
Table 2: distribution of occupational pension wealth among those who retire(in euro) by age 
  mean  90
th percentile  75
th percentile  50
th percentile 
60  40413  144934  26045  0 
61  23169  93378  51  0 
62  42807  117013  38530  0 
63  36128  76458  3900  0 
64  21706  34716  0  0 
65  59672  109943  37931  0 
66  13520  44673  3966  0 
 
Unfortunately, we have only data on the amount of occupational wealth that is withdrawn but 
no data on the accumulation of occupational pension rights.  We are thus unable to calculate 
accruals for occupational pension wealth.  This is especially regrettable since the Belgian 
fiscal treatment of occupational pension wealth provides strong incentives to withdraw at the 
age of 60: the taxation of occupational pension wealth is extremely generous from the age of 
60 on and fiscal legislation stimulates the design of pension plans that use 60 as normal 
retirement age after a career of 40 or 35 years. 
 
The relationship between private wealth and labor market transitions has been studied for the 
working-age  population  in  a  job-search  model  by  Bloemen-Stancanelli(2001).    They 
estimated a simultaneous-equations model of reservation wages, labor market transitions and 
wealth, while allowing for correlation among the unobserved effects in the error terms of the 
equations.  Interestingly, wealth enters the model as one of the simultaneous equations and as 
an explanatory variable in the reservation-wage equation.  As the authors note, “If wealth is 
correlated with unobserved individual specific characteristics that also affect the job-offer 
probability, the estimated effect of wealth on the transition probability may not represent 
solely the effect of wealth on individual preferences.  Therefore, wealth is allowed to affect 
the job-finding probability indirectly via the reservation-wage equation and via possible error 
                                                 
45 As Samwick (1998) points out for the US, the median occupational pension wealth is zero because only 30% 
of his sample is covered by occupational pension plans but nonetheless these are more important in explaining 
retirement behaviour than social security.   23 
autocorrelations”.  Since occupational wealth may be determined simultaneously with y* and 
by  the  same  variables  it x   we  extend  our  retirement  model  in  a  similar  direction
46:    we 
estimate the retirement decision simultaneously with an occupational pension wealth-equation 
and include occupational pension wealth as explanatory variable in the retirement equation:  
 




i it it c z OW e a + + = ) log(  
With log(OWit) the log of occupational pension wealth withdrawn by individual i at t, a the 
vector of coefficients associated with ) ( it it x z ¹ , a vector of exogenous and possibly time-
varying explanatory variables that will be discussed below,  it e a normally distributed random 
error term and 
OW
i c an individual-specific time-constant unobserved effect.  The unobserved 
effects of the two equations may be correlated according to a bivariate normal distribution 
with mean zero.  We will test the endogeneity of occupational wealth on the basis of the 
covariance between the unobserved effects of the cross-equations, denoted  ) , cov(
OW
i i c c = r .    
 
Bloemen-Stancanelli(2001) use a normal distribution for wealth and a quadratic function of 
wealth  as  explanatory  variable  in  the  reservation-wage  equation,  although  they  clearly 
demonstrated that their wealth data are not-normally distributed.  We use instead a lognormal 
transformation,  since  the  distribution  of  wealth  in  our  sample  is  highly  skewed.    There 
remains the question of what to do with the mass of individuals who have zero wealth since 
the log of zero is minus infinite.  In case of zero wealth one often
47 puts log(OWit) =0 what 
leads to a truncated distribution.  By doing so, one retains all individuals in the sample. 
Diamond-Hausman(1984)  omit  individuals  with  low  wealth  and  apply  a  Heckman(1979) 
correction for truncated samples.  This is of course not an option for us since we are also 
interested in the retirement behaviour of those who will not withdraw occupational wealth.  
To  avoid  infinite  dependent  variables,  Burbidge-Magee-Robb(1988)  propose  to  use  the 












= withq  a parameter to be estimated.  It has the 
                                                 
46 This is the reverse as Diamond-Hausman(1984) who analysed the individual lifecycle (dis)saving path while 
accounting for the fact that retirement might be endogenous to the (dis)savings decision (in the hypothesis that 
individuals who retire early may accumulate more wealth).   
47 F.e.Engen – Gale(2000).   24 
advantage to treat zero and negative values of wealth and approximates the logarithm in its 
right tail.
48  This distribution has also weaknesses, as noted by Jenkins-Jantti(2005, p.25): “If 
the functional forms are defined also for values of zero, the density typically has zero mass at 
that point and so cannot capture any spike at that point.”  Besides reshaping the distribution of 
wealth (choice of a normal, lognormal or inverse hyperbolic sine function), one could also 
rescale the distribution of wealth (f.e. OWit/1000 or OWit /100 or OWit /10).  It appeared that 
rescaling has no effect at all on the other estimated coefficients of the model (in particular no 
effect at all on SSW and accrual) but reduces the residual variability and improves the fit 
considerably.  After experimenting with various rescaling and reshaping scenarios, the best fit 
is obtained when we convert OWit into yearly annuities.  For the wealth equation, we take 
therefore the lognormal transformation of these yearly annuities.   
 
To identify the model,  it z should include besides the explanatory variables of  it x at least one 
exclusion  restriction.    Good  exclusion  restrictions  should  only  affect  the  amount  of 
occupational pension wealth an individual may receive while it may have no effect on the old-
age  retirement  decision
49.  We  used  as  exclusion  restrictions  in  the  occupational  wealth 
equation a dummy for blue-collar worker and dummies for sector of activity (both measured 
in 1991) that were insignificant in the old-age retirement equation and are used as exclusion 
restrictions.  The idea is that being white collar and working in specific sectors is related to 
membership of an occupational pension plan
50.  
 
4.2. Estimation results 
 
The estimated coefficients with standard errors (and average  marginal effects in bold) in 
parentheses are in table “. Standard errors are adjusted for serial dependence at the level of the 
individual. 
Table 3: Discrete-time hazard model for receipt of old-age pension benefits and occupational pension 
wealth 
                                                 
48 A first application is Bloemen(2008) who transforms in this way the dependent variable in a net wealth 
equation and uses net wealth/10000 as explanatory variable in a logistic retirement equation.  Another 
application is found in Kapteyn-Panis(2006) who estimated only a net wealth equation with q =1. 
49 According to Bloemen(2008), “good exclusion restrictions are notoriously hard to find in a lifecycle model in 
which variables are jointly determined”.  He includes one lag of net disposable household income as exclusion 
restriction which had a significant effect on the level of wealth.  It is difficult to find useful examples of 
exclusion restrictions in a wealth equation in the literature. 
50 Berghman et al.(2004) confirms these are one of the characteristics of members of occupational plans in 
Belgium.    25 
  Quadratic age trend  Age dummies 
Dependent variable  Retirement equation  Log(OWit)  Retirement 
equation 
Log(OWit) 





























Duration career  0.006 
(0.007) 
  0.006 
(0.008) 
 
OWit  0.000002** 
(0.000000) 
  0.0000027** 
(0,000000) 
 








Age of the individual 




   




   




































































Education level of individual 








High school (3 years)  -0.585**  -0.165**  -0.774**  -0.128**   26 
(0.158)  (0.05)  (0.18)  (0.04) 










Sectoral activity of individual 
Energy, chemical 
industry  
  0.238 
(0.11) 
  0.159 
(0.101) 
(Metallic) and other 
industries 
  0.272* 
(0.11) 
  0.199 
(0.09) 
Construction    0.243* 
(0.11) 
  0.164 
(0.09) 
Horeca    0.170 
(0.114) 




  0.173 
(0.11) 
  0.136 
(0.105) 
Banking insurance    0.324** 
(0.11) 





  0.266* 
(0.136) 
  0.184 
(0.12) 
R&D, teaching    0.033 
(0.11) 
  -0.016 
(0.104) 
Socio-cultural sector    0.050 
(0.120) 
  0.0034 
(.106) 
Others     0.159 
(0.116) 
  0.096 
(0.10) 
 
Blue-collar worker    -0.095** 
(0.02) 
  -0.093** 
(0.02) 
Dummy for having 










Dummy for having 














































































































-2Log Likelihood  289452  280174 
Number observations  48820  48820 
*denotes significance at 5%level, ** denotes significance at 1%level.  Standard errors in parenthesis.  The 
reference individual lives in Flemish region, primary education level, without children or disabled dependants, 
has not been disabled, has not been unemployed, unknown sectoral activity, white-collar in 1990. 
 
The most interesting for us is the effect of retirement incentives on labour supply behaviour.   
The  incentive  measures  have  a  significant  impact  on  the  probability  of  retirement.    The 
estimated coefficient of SSW is positive: this suggests that leisure is a normal good and the 
probability to retire increases if the individual expects to receive a higher amount of lifetime 
wealth in the future.
51  The estimated coefficient of the accrual is negative, suggesting a 
negative substitution effect.  This means that if leisure becomes relatively less expensive than 
consumption, individuals substitute consumption by leisure.  
 
The coefficients of a non-linear model show the sign of a change in an explanatory variable 
but do not allow to interpret the magnitude of this change.  Usually in duration models, one 
calculates hazard ratios (in case of an extreme value distribution of error term) or odds ratios 
(in  case  of  a  logistic  distribution  of  the  error  term)  to  interpret  the  coefficients.    The 
calculation  of  marginal  effects  is  common  in  binary  panel  models
52  but  not  in  duration 
models
53.    We  follow  the  approach  of  Euwals-Wolthoff-Vanvuuren(2006)
54  to  calculate 
marginal effects in duration models as the change in expected retirement age resulting from a 
marginal  change  in  an  explanatory  variable.    This  quantity  can  be  calculated  for  each 
individual and then one can take the average of all individuals.  In the age dummy estimation, 
a marginal increase of SSW (resp. accrual) with 1000 euro decreases (resp. increases) the 
expected retirement age with 0.011 years (0.218 years).  In the age trend specification, an 
increase  of  SSW  (resp.  accrual)  with  1000euro  decreases  (resp.  increases)  the  expected 
retirement age with 0.008 years (resp. 0.32 years).   
                                                 
51 In the NBER research project, Grüber-Wise(2004) note that “the estimated effect of SSW however is often not 
statistically different from zero and in many cases is of the wrong sign”.  Dellis et al.(2004) that do the 
estimation for Belgium find a negative coefficient of SSW, although they also included average lifecycle wages.  
The difference is that in the NBER research project SSW accounts for all retirement pathways and in addition for 
the civil servants and self-employed and they do not correct for a selection effect in the composition of the 
sample over time.  On the contrary, we limit our analysis to the old-age pension system of private sector 
employees (what reduces measurement errors) and correct for the fact that the sample may be over time 
composed of individuals with a higher propensity to work.  Piekkola-Deschryvere(2004) found on the basis of 
the PSBH for Belgium also a negative sign of SSW. 
52 See Wooldridge(2002) for several examples. 
53 Diamond-Hausman(1984) and Meghir-Whitehouse(1997) calculate elasticities to interpret their results. 
54 P.29-30.   28 
 
We found that if we omit the variable average lifetime wages the coefficient of SSW is 
negative.  This suggests, as explained above, that higher lifetime earners will have higher 
levels of SSW but may also have greater preferences for work.  If we control for average 
lifetime wages, the coefficient on SSW turns positive and the coefficient of average lifetime 
wages is negative.  This means that the incentive effects may be misestimated if one does not 
control for omitted factors which are correlated with work preferences.   
 
The age variable has as expected a strong effect on retirement probability.  Replacing the age 
dummies by the quadratic age variable affects the coefficients of the incentive measures but 
not the other explanatory variables.  This indicates that the age dummies or linear age trend 
may, besides age effects, also convey other information like health status or social norms.  
The fact that the age dummies are highly significant at the early and normal retirement age 
signals that the age dummies absorb some of the eligibility effects that should be captured by 
the accrual.   
 
Individual  observed  characteristics  such  as  a  higher  education  level  delay  retirement.    A 
reason may be that investment in human capital leads to more attachment to the labour market 
or  that  highly  educated  individuals  are  healthier  and  therefore  work  longer.    The  fact  of 
having been disabled leads to a decrease of probability to retire in old-age pension system 
while this is not the case for having been unemployed.
   Indeed we observed that, for our 
sample, 50% of men transit from disability to old-age pension benefit after the age of 61 and 
30% of men at the age of 65 while 35% of unemployed men transit from unemployment to 
old-age  pension  benefits  after  the  age  of  61  and  only  10%  at  the  age  of  65.    Note  that 
employees  living  in  Wallonia  have  a  significant  lower  probability  to  retire  in  old-age 
retirement.  This means that individuals living in Wallonia work longer or retire relatively 
more through other pathways.  
 
The  variable  “duration  of  the  career”  decreases  the  coefficient  of  SSW.    It  is  however 
insignificant.    If  we  use  “duration”  and  “squared  duration”  they  remain  completely 
insignificant: there does not seem to be a sorting effect, after controlling for observed and 
unobserved  heterogeneity.    We  found  that  controlling  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  has 
almost no effect on the predicted hazard rates except for the ages 65, 66, 67 and 68 where the   29 
predicted hazard rates with unobserved effect is much lower than the predicted hazard rate 
without controlling for unobserved effect.   
 
The  correlation  between  the  unobserved  effects  of  the  retirement  and  wealth  equation  is 
positive and strongly significant: there are unobserved factors that at the same time induce 
individuals to retire and to dissave.  A formal likelihood ratio test
55 of significance of the 
covariance parameter estimates confirmed that the model that allows for correlation between 
the unobserved effects is clearly to be preferred to the one that does not.  
 
In the occupational wealth equation, age dummies become highly significant at the age of 60 
that is the age at which the fiscal treatment of occupational pensions becomes very generous.  
Secondly, the fact of having dependent children delays, ceteris paribus, the decision to take up 
occupational wealth but is not significantly related to the decision to claim old-age pension 
benefits.  The number of disabled in the household decreases the probability that one will 
withdraw occupational pension wealth.  This may be because members of the second pillar 
are more likely to be healthy individuals or because the presence of a disabled partner, that 
could be associated to increased costs, may delay the decision to quit the labour market and to 
depend on replacement income.  Finally, as expected, it was found that being white-collar and 
working  in  the  banking-insurance  sector  is  highly  explaining  eligibility  for  occupational 
pension  wealth.    We  tested  the  includability  of  these  dummies  in  the  wealth  equation: 
= - R UR Loglik LogLik 2 2 -280174-(-280235) = 61.  Since this value exceeds the critical value 
with Q=11, we reject 0 H that they cannot be included.   
 
4.3. Predicted retirement age  
 
In this section, the estimated coefficients are used to predict retirement probabilities where the 
retirement incentives (SSW, accrual) correspond to the ones of a reformed old-age pension 
system.  The resulting retirement probabilities are then compared with the ones that were 
predicted in the status quo. 
 
                                                 
55 Under H0,  3 , 395
2
1 = c and (Prob>
2
1 c )<0.0001. 
   30 
Section 3 explained that the 5% adjustment of pension benefits leads to a less negative accrual 
for all ages while it leads to less SSW before age 65 and more SSW after age 65.  Given the 
sign of the estimated coefficients, both the substitution and the income effect predict a higher 
retirement age under this reform.   For the same reasons one expects that the lump sum reform 
predicts a higher retirement age.   
 
The pension bonus leads on the one hand to a higher SSW for every age of retirement after 
age  60,  compared  to  the  status  quo.    We  therefore  expect  the  income  effect  to  induce 
individuals  to  retire  sooner.    On  the  other  hand,  it  leads  to  a  less  negative  accrual  for 
retirement ages between 60 and 65.  This substitution effect will stimulate individuals to 
postpone  retirement.    The  substitution  and  income  effect  work  therefore  in  the  opposite 
direction and one has to look at the empirical results to see what effect dominates.   
 
Figures 17-18 illustrate the predicted hazard rates after the reforms in the old-age pension 
system together with the predicted hazard rates in the status quo.   
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On  the  basis  of  the  predicted  hazard  rates  the  predicted  average  retirement  age  can  be 
calculated.     31 
Table 4: observed and predicted retirement age 
Observed
56  61.82  years 
  Status quo  5%reform  Lumpsum reform  bonus 
quadratic age  61,82  62,915  62,840  62,18 
age dummy  61,88  62.80  62,7237  62,13 
 
Moving towards actuarial fairness at the margin increases the average retirement age with 1.1 
years in the 5% adjustment reform and lump sum reform and only 0.3 years for the bonus.  
Note that if occupational pension wealth would be taxed higher in case of early withdrawal 
before age 65, this would in our model lead to a higher expected retirement age.   
 
4.4. Budgetary impact  
 
The  next  question  is  whether  these  reforms  alleviate  the  pressure  on  the  financial 
sustainability  of  pay-as-you-go  systems  in  Belgium.    In  order  to  estimate  the  impact  of 
pension reforms on the government budget one first calculates the distribution of retirement 
ages in the status quo and under the reform.  The shift in the distribution of the retirement 
ages before and after a reform is very similar in figures 19-20 for the 5% reform and lump 
sum reform.  For the bonus reform recently implemented by the Belgian government the 
distribution of retirement ages shifts less.  Secondly, one calculates for both distributions of 
retirement ages, the SSW and present discounted value of payroll taxes in the old-age pension 
system that corresponds to each of the ages in the distribution.   
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56 Note that the predicted retirement age refers only to those who retire through the old-age pension system.  A 
retirement age taking into account exits into unemployment, early retirement and disability like Desmet-Jousten-
Perelman-Pestieau(2003) would be much lower.  They observed a retirement age of 58.38 for men and 57.43 for 
women on the basis of the same data as we work on.     32 
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Then we calculate a weighted SSW and a weighted discounted sum of payroll taxes using the 
probability of retiring at a given age as the weight.  The implications of the pension reforms 
for the government budget are summarized in table 5
57. 
 
Table 5: Budgetary implications of pension reforms 
  Status quo  5% reform  Lumps sum 
reform 
Bonus  5%  lumpsum  bonus 
Mean SSW (euro)  %change relative to status quo 
quadratic age  134742  123524  124007  141101  -0.084  -0.080  +0.047 
age dummy  134800  123395  123894  141011  -0.085  -0.080  +0.046 
Mean discounted value of payroll taxes (euro)
 58  %change relative to status quo 
quadratic age  52518  57350  56964  54250  +0.092  +0.085  +0.03 
age dummy  52820  56778  56440  54038  +0.075  +0.070  +0.02 
 
First of all, the pension bonus has, as expected, a very limited effect on the government 
budget.    Since  it  increases  government  expenditures  on  pension  benefits  more  than  it 
increases  government  revenues  through  higher  payroll  taxes,  it  seems  to  exacerbate  the 
unsustainability of the pension system
59.  This contrasts with the 5% reform that increases 
fiscal revenues since on the one hand it leads to a decrease of expenditures on net pension 
benefits with 8.50% and on the other hand an increase of revenues on payroll taxes with 9%.  
The lump sum reform has a similar effect.   
 
                                                 
57Desmet-Jousten-Perelman-Pestieau(2003) predicts for the 6% adjustment reform an increase of payroll taxes 
between 5-11% and a decrease of benefits of 18-20%.  This simulation is based on a weighted SSW for all 
retirement pathways (unemployment, disability, old-age pension, early retirement schemes) and not only for 
private-sector employees but in addition for civil servants and self-employed.  
58   The discounted sum of payroll taxes over ages takes 52 as the starting age.  
59 Also the Study Commission for Ageing estimated in her rapport of 2007 increased pension expenditures for 
the government in 2007-2013 due to the pension bonus.   33 
The total effect of a reform on the government budget can in fact be decomposed in two 
effects: first, a direct effect by changing payroll taxes and benefits for a given work history 
(the “mechanical” effect) and second, an indirect effect through labour supply responses to 
the reform (the “behavioural” effect).  To show this, we first express the total effect of the 
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R
the probability of retiring at age s under the reformed pension system and  PS
B
the 
probability of retiring at age s under the status quo.  Then decompose the total effect by 
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The first bracket contains the behavioural effect and the second bracket the mechanical effect.   
 
Both the mechanical and behavioural effect are simulated on the basis of the labour supply 
responses estimated in the previous section.  The idea is to calculate first the expenditures (net 
pension  benefits)  and  revenues  (payroll  taxes  in  the  old-age  pension  system)  for  the 
government under the current system and under the reformed system under the hypothesis 
there is no effect on labour supply.  This is the mechanical effect.  Then we compare this with 
the  total  effect  on  government  budget  shown  in  table  8.    The  behavioural  effect  is  the 
difference between the total effect and the mechanical effect.  It is entirely due to the shift in 
the  distribution  of  retirement  ages.    The  decomposition  of  the  fiscal  implications  in  a 
mechanical and behavioural effect is shown in table 6.  
 
Table 6: Decomposition of  budgetary implications into mechanical and behavioural effect 
  5% reform  Lump sum reform
60  Bonus 
  Behavioural  Mechanical  Total  Behavioural  Mechanical  Total  Behavioural  Mechanical  Total 
Mean SSW 
                                                 
60 The mechanical effect of the lumpsum and 5% adjustment reform is not exactly the same although the 
lumpsum amount was chosen such that, under the hypothesis of no labour supply adjustment, it has the same 
budgetary impact as the 5% adjustment reform. This is because the adjustment of gross pension benefits takes 
place before the application of the progressive income tax.  This generates changes in the income distribution. 
We go further on this in 4.5.   34 
quadratic 
age 
1000  -12218  -11218  590  -11325  -10735  -268  6626  6358 
age 
dummy 
828  -12233  -11405  517  -11422  -10905  -170  6380  6210 
Mean discounted value of payroll taxes 
quadratic 
age 
4830  0  4830  4444  0  4444  1730  0  1730 
age  
dummy 
3956  0  3956  3618  0  3618  1216  0  1216 
Total effect of mean SSW and mean discounted payroll taxes 
quadratic 
age 
5830  -12218  -6388  5035  -11325  -6290  1462  6626  8089 
age 
dummy 
4784  -12233  -7449  4135  -11422  -7287  1046  6380  7426 
 
It shows that penalizing early retirement has a considerable impact on retirement behaviour.  
The behavioural effect, that accounts for 1/3 of the total effect, shows that people are prepared 
to  work  longer  in  order  to  maintain  high  pension  benefits.    It  remains  however 
counterbalanced by a considerably higher mechanical effect that accounts for 2/3 of the total 
effect.  
 
Since the reforms concern purely the calculation of pension benefits they have no mechanical 
impact  on  the  payroll  taxes.    However,  due  to  the  fact  that  people  report  the  retirement 
decision, they pay payroll taxes during a longer period.  This has a considerable effect on 
government revenues, at least for the 5% adjustment and lump sum reform, and is a pure 
behavioural effect.   
 
The fact that the pension bonus, that is recently implemented in the Belgian old-age pension 
system, exacerbates the burden on the government budget is purely because the mechanical 
effect outweighs the behavioural effect.  Thus whether or not the bonus has a behavioural 
effect, it will exacerbate the burden on the government budget, due to the mechanical effect.        
 
Note also that the budgetary implication of the behavioural effect of the bonus is slightly 
negative (-268 and -170) for SSW while clearly positive for payroll taxes
61.  The reason is 
that expected SSW under the bonus reform decreases sharply at the age of 65 (see figure 14) 
                                                 
61 Desmet-Jousten-Perelman-Pestieau(2003) finds similarly a slightly negative behavioural effect on mean SSW 
when they simulate the absence of the assimilation of periods of inactivity in the Belgian old-age pension 
system.   To explain this, they decompose the budgetary implication of the behavioural effect by age of 
retirement, by distinguishing the probability change by age and the expected SSW by age.       35 
after which the pension bonus is not attributed anymore.  At the same time there is a shift in 
the distribution of retirement ages so that proportionally more individuals are predicted to 
retire after age 65.  For those individuals, the expected SSW after age 65 with bonus will be 
lower than in the predicted status quo before age 65 without bonus.     
   
4.5. Redistributive impact for the old-age retired  
 
Ultimately what interests us is the impact of the previously discussed pension reforms on 
income  inequality  among  the retired  taking  into  account  individual  labour  supply  effects.  
Since  these  results  may  be  sensitive  to  the  measure  of  inequality,  different  measures  of 
income inequality are considered: the Gini coefficient, Atkinson index and interquartile ratio.   
 
To present the situation schematically, let us distinguish three types of individuals indexed by 
j = L, M, H for respectively low, medium and high income individuals.  Their respective gross 
pension benefits in a pay-as-you go system can be described as: 
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 the average wage in the population,  1 0 < ￿ < a 
payroll tax rate,  l - 1  the fixed labour supply of an individual, Rj the retirement age for an 
individual  of  type  j  and  1 0 < ￿ < j the  probability  of  being  an  individual  of  type  j.    One 
assumes  that w L= 0 .    The  factor  1 0 £ £ ￿   represents  the  degree  to  which  the  system  is 
bismarckian  or  beveridgean.    If  0 = ￿ ,  ) 1 ( l w ￿ = Pj - :  all  individuals  receive  the  same 
pension irrespective of their contributions.  The pension system is beveridgean.  If  ￿= 1 , 
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0
1  the system is bismarckian.   
   36 
The 5% reform is represented by a multiplicative factor ￿ that affects the bismarckian part of 
gross  pension  benefits  through  a  mechanical  effect  ( ￿ )  and  a  behavioural  effect  ( (￿ R j ) 




R j .  The lumpsum reform adds to the bismarckian part of benefits 
a term K = K = K H M <0 while the bonus adds a term  K = K = K H M >0.   
An  income  tax  is  applied  on  the  bismarckian  part  of  pension  benefits  consisting  of  an 





  and  the  lowest  rate  equals  0: 
0 t = ) (PL .  Net pension benefits are then  )) (P ( P = P j j jN t 1- . 
 
In going from the gross to the net benefit different stages can be distinguished.  First, the 
pension reform modifies gross pension benefits.  Second, income tax is applied to these gross 
pension benefits in order to calculate net pension benefits.  Third, in response to a change of 
net pension benefits, individuals might change labour supply.  It seems interesting to measure 
income inequality that results from the mechanical application of the reforms and the final 
income distribution that takes into account their mechanical and behavioural effect.   
 
To  start,  we  discuss  the  mechanical  effect  of  the  reform  that  leads  to  a  change  of  gross 
pension benefits without allowing people to change labour supply.  The 5% and lumpsum 
reform reduce gross pension benefits.  The lumpsum reform is relatively more penalizing 
individuals of type M than H.  This is because the lump sum amount differs only by age 
cohort while the 5% adjustment of benefits depends on age and income.  The bonus increases 
gross pension benefits and is relatively more increasing the wellbeing of individuals of type 
M  than  type  H:  K l ￿￿w > ￿ l ￿￿w > K + l ￿￿w M M M - - - - ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( and 
K + l ￿￿w < K l ￿￿w < ￿ l ￿￿w H H H ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( - - - - .    Second,  both  the  5%  adjustment  and 
lumpsum reforms decrease taxable income and thus tax liability and income tax revenues for 
the government.  The lumpsum reform decreases the tax liability relatively less for individuals 
of type H than M.  On the contrary the bonus increases taxable income, tax liability and thus 
income  tax  revenues  for  the  government.    The  tax  liability  increases  relatively  more  for 
individuals of type M than H.  We find that, as far as the mechanical effect concerns and 
independently of the inequality index used, inequality decreases most for the 5% adjustment 
reform.  This is explained as follows: the 5% and lumpsum reform reduces pension benefits   37 
until eventually one reaches the level of means-tested benefits, the beveridgean component of 
the Belgian old-age pension system.  Indeed, a lot of individuals of type M see their pension 
benefits  reduced  by  a  percentage  that  is  effectively  less  than  the  percentage  applied  to 
individuals of type H since they reach faster the beveridgean level.  On the other hand the 
bonus recently implemented by the Belgian government increases old-age pension benefits of 
individuals of type M relatively more than individuals of type H but at the same time the 
bonus leads mechanically to an increase of income inequality between those enjoying pension 
benefits (bismarckian part) (individuals of type M and H) and those relying on assistance 
benefits (beveridgean part) (individuals of type L).   
 
About the behavioural effect, one might expect some reranking of individuals due to labour 
supply effects.  For the 5% reform, the behavioural effect does increase income inequality a 
little bit.  This suggests that the cut of pension benefits induces the individuals of type H 
relatively more to work longer in order to avoid the cut of pension benefits.  Our estimations 

















R M H such that high income individuals react more to retirement 
incentives  than  low  income  individuals.    For  the  lumpsum  reform  and  the  bonus
62,  the 
behavioural effect marginally decreases income inequality, independently of the inequality 
index used.  This suggests that a lumpsum adjustment does not give enough incentives to 
individuals of type H to work longer and receive higher pension benefits.   
 
Since the mechanical effect outweighs the behavioural effect, the 5% reform leads in total to 
the lowest degree of income inequality among the retired independently of the inequality 
index used.  This is a rather surprising result but has mostly to do with the fact that these 
reforms do not affect means-tested benefits.   
 
Finally, one has to realize that if the number of pensioners increases over time, the amount of 
money raised for the government by the 5% or lumpsum reform would have to be distributed 
among an increasing number of pensioners.  Thus the amount would decrease over time and 
induce a redistribution among different cohorts retiring at different times.  The bonus will 
instead, due to demographic ageing, increase the budgetary cost for the government over time.  
Only in the absence of demographic ageing, there will be no redistribution among cohorts.   
                                                 
62 Note that due to different lumpsum amounts, it is difficult to compare the lumpsum reform with the bonus.   38 
 
Table 7: redistributive impact on old-age retired 
  Status quo  5%reform  Lump sum reform  Bonus 
Gini coefficient 
    Mechanical  Mechanical+ 
behavioural 
Mechanical  Mechanical+ behavioural  mechanical  Mechanical+ 
behavioural 
quadratic age  0.10  0.0891  0.0894  0.098  0.096  0.096  0.094 
age dummy  0.10  0.0880  0.0885  0.098  0.096  0.096  0.095 
Atkinson index 
￿ =0.75 
quadratic age  0.0039  0.00312  0.00312  0.0038  0.0036  0.0036  0.0035 
age dummy  0.0039  0.00305  0.00307  0.0038  0.0036  0.0036  0.0035 
￿ =0.5 
quadratic age  0.0078  0.00625  0.00624  0.0077  0.0072  0.0073  0.0070 
age dummy  0.0078  0.00611  0.00613  0.0076  0.0072  0.0072  0.0071 
￿ =0.25 
quadratic age  0.0117  0.00937  0.00936  0.0115  0.0108  0.011  0.0106 
age dummy  0.0117  0.00916  0.00919  0.0114  0.0109  0.0106  0.0106 
Interquartile ratio 
quadratic age  1.30  1.268  1.269  1.298  1.293  1.284  1.277 
age dummy  1.30  1.269  1.266  1.292  1.287  1.287  1.282   39 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
The  old-age  pension  system  for  private-sector  employees  provides  strong  incentives 
towards retirement at the age of eligibility.  The adjustment of pension benefits by 5% 
and the lumpsum reform reduce substantially these retirement incentives.  The bonus, 
recently  implemented  in  the  Belgian  old-age  pension  system,  reduces  the  retirement 
incentives between age 60 and 64, but is not high enough to shift the peak in SSW from 
age 60 to age 65.  Since it is only applied to the ages 60-65 it leads to a strongly negative 
accrual at age 65.    
 
Further,  the  impact  of  these  reforms  on  the  retirement  age,  government  budget  and 
income  distribution  of  the  retired  was  examined.    The  5%  and  the  lumpsum  reform 
increase the retirement age with 1.1years.  They reduce government expenditure on old-
age benefits with 8.5% and increase government revenues from payroll taxes with 9%.  
This contrasts with the pension bonus.  Since the amount of the bonus is so low and due 
to offsetting income and substitution effects, it only increases retirement age with 0.3 
years.    The bonus is expected to exacerbate the burden on the government budget.  
 
The impact of reforms was predicted while accounting for simultaneity of the retirement 
decision with the decision to withdraw occupational pension wealth.  One might expect 
that reforms of the old-age system have more impact if they were accompanied by a 
change of the eligibility rules and fiscal treatment of occupational pensions.   
 
Ultimately  when  considering  the  redistributive  impact  of  these  reforms,  the  5% 
adjustment reform leads to the lowest degree of income inequality among the retired.  
This is a rather surprising result that has mostly to do with the fact that these reforms only 
affect the Bismarckian part of pension benefits.  In particular the 5% adjustment and 
lumpsum reform increase the number of people relying on means-tested benefits but the 
bonus instead increases the distance between those who have a larger part of Bismarckian 
pension  benefits  with  those  relying  only  on  means-tested  benefits.    Finally,  the 
behavioural effect increases income inequality a bit under the 5% adjustment reform but   40 
it is outweighted by the mechanical effect.  The 5% adjustment reform thus not only 
enhances financial sustainability of the system but at the same time decreases income 
inequality among the old-age retired at most. 
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The Belgian old-age pension system consists of 4 schemes.  Three schemes are organised 
on  a  contributory  base:  the  private-sector  employees,  the  civil  servants  and  the  self-
employed.    The  fourth  category  consists  of  means-tested  benefits  available  from  the 
normal retirement age
63.   
The old-age pension system of private-sector employees that is financed on a pay-as-you-
go basis allows for flexible retirement between 60 and 65
64 while it does not impose any 
actuarial adjustment of benefits on the choice of the retirement age.  Nonetheless pension 
benefits increase by 1/45 for men and 1/40
65 for women as long as the employee has not 
reached a full career of 45 respectively 40 years. 
 
The amount of pension benefits depends on the number of years worked as private-sector 
employee and the level of wages obtained during each year of that career.  The number of 
years  of  the career  consists  of  the sum  of  periods worked and  spent  on  replacement 
income.  Pension benefits are calculated for each year of the career on the basis of real 
wages and for periods spent on replacement income on the basis of a fictive wage.  The 
latter is a fixed amount for periods during 1955-1967.  Since 1967 fictive wages are 
based on the real wages in the last year of activity.  
 
Wages above a price-indexed ceiling (44.994euro in 2007) are not taken into account for 
the calculation of pension benefits.  This ceiling corresponds to the 85
th percentile income 
in our dataset.  Wages are for each year of the career price-indexed and since 1973 to the 
                                                 
63 That is, for the means-tested benefit scheme until 1
st July 1997, 65 for men and 60 for women.  Since 1
st 
July 1997, the age of eligibility for women gradually increased to 65 in 2009. 
64 Before 1
st January 1991, the normal retirement age is fixed at 65 for men and 60 for women and 
retirement could be advanced by maximum 5 years at the cost of a reduction of benefits with 5% for each 
year of anticipation before the normal retirement age.  Since 16 July 1986(Royal Decree 415)  it was not 
allowed anymore for women to retire in the old-age system before 60.  Since 1
st January 1991, the actuarial 
adjustment of benefits is abolished.  Since 1
st July 1997, flexible retirement before the normal retirement 
age is conditional on a career of 20 years.  The required number of years of the career gradually increased 
to 35 in 2005.  
65Women are since 1
st July 1997 in a transitory regime that increases the full career from 40 tot 45 years 
and the normal retirement age from 60 to 65 by the year 2009.   45 
evolution of wages between the year of the career and the year of retirement.
66  From the 
moment the pension has been taken up, benefits are only adjusted to price inflation.   
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Where n denotes a year during the career, Z the number of years of a complete career, N 
the year corresponding to the take up of the pension, C the number of years of the career, 
In the price or revaluation index corresponding to n, 
max
n w  the wage ceiling corresponding 
to n, wn real or fictive wages corresponding to n and k is a replacement rate equal to 75% 
or 60% depending on whether the beneficiary is married or single.  Only married 
individuals of whom the partner does not receive any labour or replacement income are 
entitled to the 75% rate.   The widow(er) obtains a survival benefit equal to 80% of the 
pension benefit of the former husband or spouse, calculated at the 75% rate.  Note that 
while the age of eligibility for old-age benefits is 60 that survivor benefits are available 
from the age of 45 on. 
 
In addition, when the career is complete, the benefit cannot be inferior to a price-indexed 
minimum.  If the career is not complete but at least equal to two third of a complete 
career, the same amount but proportional to the length of the career is guaranteed.    
 
Old-age pension benefits are subject to a health insurance tax of 3.55% and a solidarity 
tax between 0.5 and 2% depending on income
67.  They are also subject to an earnings 
test.  For earnings above a limit, pension entitlement is fully suspended.  The limit is 
higher after age 65 and higher for survivor beneficiaries.  The effective income tax rate 
on retired people is generally very low due to income splitting, tax allowances in function 
of household composition and tax deductions for replacement incomes.   
                                                 
66 The adjustment to general wages gradually disappeared for pensions taken up after 1
st July 1997.   
67 Since 1
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